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ABSTRACT
We examine how the presence of multiple supervisory agencies affects firm-level compliance in form
and substance with disclosure regulations. This analysis is important because coordination problems
among regulators are frequently present in practice but often overlooked in academic research. We
exploit that banks are subject to equivalent risk disclosure rules under securities laws (IFRS 7) and
banking regulation (Pillar 3 of the Basel II Accord) but that different regulators start enforcing the
rules at different points in time. We find that banks substantially increase their formal risk disclosures
upon the adoption of Pillar 3 even if they already had to comply with the same requirements under
IFRS 7. The effects are stronger if the central bank is responsible for bank supervision and bank reg-
ulators are equipped with more supervisory resources, but are less pronounced if the securities mar-
ket regulator is an independent entity. In turn, banks facing more market pressures are more
compliant with the rules. We further find persistent liquidity benefits of the increased risk disclosures
but only after Pillar 3 became effective and its compliance was enforced by the banking regulator.
Our results suggest that formal and material compliance with risk disclosure regulation are a function
of both the resources of the supervisory agency and its incentive alignment with the regulated firms.
In our setting, the banking regulator seems more effective in fulfilling this role.
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Un conte de deux superviseurs : conformité avec la réglementation
relative à la divulgation des risques dans le secteur bancaire
RESUME
Nous examinons de quelle façon la présence de plusieurs organismes de surveillance influence la con-
formité des entreprises avec la réglementation relative à la communication de l’information, tant sur le
plan de la forme que sur le fond. Cette analyse est importante, car les problèmes de coordination entre
les organismes de réglementation sont fréquents dans la pratique, mais sont souvent mis de côté dans le
cadre de la recherche universitaire. Nous faisons valoir que les banques sont assujetties à des règles
équivalentes en matière de divulgation des risques en vertu des lois sur les valeurs mobilières (IFRS 7)
et de la réglementation du secteur bancaire (pilier 3 de l’accord de Bâle II), mais que les divers organ-
ismes de réglementation appliquent les règles à différents moments. Nous établissons que les banques
augmentent de façon importante leurs divulgations des risques formelles depuis l’adoption du pilier 3
même si elles étaient déjà tenues de respecter les mêmes exigences aux termes de la norme IFRS 7. Les
effets sont plus marqués lorsque la banque centrale est responsable de la supervision des banques et que
les organismes de réglementation du secteur bancaire disposent de plus de ressources de surveillance,
mais sont moins prononcés lorsque l’organisme de réglementation du marché des valeurs mobilières
est une entité indépendante. En retour, les banques qui font face à des pressions plus importantes du
marché respectent davantage les règles. Nous trouvons aussi des avantages persistants en termes de
liquidité associés avec la hausse des divulgations des risques, mais seulement depuis l’entrée en
vigueur du pilier 3 et lorsque son application était assurée par l’organisme de réglementation des
banques. Nos résultats portent à croire que la conformité formelle et matérielle avec la réglementation
en matière de divulgation des risques est fonction des ressources de l’organisme de surveillance et de
son harmonisation sur le plan des incitatifs avec les entreprises réglementées. Dans notre contexte,
l’organisme de réglementation du secteur bancaire semble plus efficace pour s’acquitter de cette tâche.
Mots-clés : réglementation de la communication d’information, divulgations des risques, liquidité,
institutions financières, IFRS, Bâle II
“Rebuilding investors’ confidence and trust in the banking industry is vital to the future health of
the financial system—and responding to their demands for better risk disclosures is an important
step in achieving that goal.” (Financial Stability Board 2012, introductory letter to the report)
1. Introduction
Disclosure regulation plays a key part in well-functioning capital markets. The success of any new
disclosure requirements depends not only on the written rules but also on how regulators and the
firms they regulate implement and adhere to these rules. In particular, public enforcement is often
seen as an important determinant of the effectiveness of financial reporting regulation
(e.g., Glaeser et al. 2001; Holthausen 2009; Christensen et al. 2016). One important aspect of pub-
lic enforcement is the choice and structure of the supervisory institutions. In practice, there often
exists a specialized industry regulator aside from the securities market regulator that shares the
charge of designing and monitoring the disclosure regime. From a public-interest view of regula-
tion (Posner 1974), the existence of multiple regulators should not affect the effectiveness of their
supervisory activities as they all have the overall well-being of financial markets and their constitu-
ents in mind. However, in line with the self-interest view of regulation (Stigler 1971), different
regulators could also follow their own agenda and, for example, view the role of transparency for
the functioning of capital markets differently (e.g., Flannery 2020). In addition, variation in the
endowment of regulators with staff and resources and, hence, in their supervisory capabilities can
further affect how multiple supervisory agencies perform their tasks (e.g., Jackson and Roe 2009).
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Prior research offers evidence on the supervisory outcomes of multiple regulators that substi-
tute for each other over time (Agarwal et al. 2014; Costello et al. 2019). Less is known about the
regulatory outcomes of a design in which multiple supervisory agencies are simultaneously tasked
with overlapping responsibilities. In this paper, we examine how the parallel existence of multiple
supervisory bodies with different tool sets and potentially diverging priorities affects formal com-
pliance with disclosure rules as well as regulated firms’ material transparency of financial reports.
To address this research question, we identify a setting in the context of international banking that
has several desirable features. First, our setting holds the written rules constant (not literally, but
in a fundamental sense), while we can exploit cross-country variation in the attributes and objec-
tives of who is responsible for the enforcement of the rules. More specifically, IFRS 7 requires
disclosures about the nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments and applies to
all firms subject to IFRS reporting. Its enforcement, in general, lies with the agency supervising
national securities markets and is sometimes delegated to a third party, like the local stock
exchange. With the third pillar of the Basel II Accord (Pillar 3), the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision issued risk disclosure requirements that, in many aspects, are equivalent to IFRS
7 but fall under the auspices of the national banking supervisor.1
Second, the staggered adoption of IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 offers better identification of how the dif-
ferent types of regulators impact the effectiveness of the rules than if both sets of rules had been
enacted at the same time. This staggered adoption extends to the analysis of capital-market effects.
We exploit the (arguably exogenous) monthly variation in when banks initially release the risk disclo-
sures under IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 to identify their effects on stock liquidity. Third, both IFRS 7 and
Pillar 3 are the result of supranational regulatory efforts and impose a periodic schedule of when
banks have to disclose the information. This institutional feature mitigates concerns that the regulated
firms actively influence the content, timing, or even avoidance of the new regulations. Fourth, focus-
ing on a clearly defined set of disclosure items lets us objectively measure compliance with the new
rules (i.e., firms either disclose an item or not) and then link observed differences to market percep-
tions. This setup enables us to distinguish between compliance in form, which also can include boiler-
plate language or a pure “check-the-box” approach, and compliance in substance when market
participants update their priors in response to new information. Only the latter outcome is consistent
with effective enforcement of the enhanced disclosure rules.
Our sample comprises 119 banks from 29 Basel II countries that report under IFRS and issue
Pillar 3 reports. To enable difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation, we include 147 benchmark
firms: (i) 28 banks domiciled in Basel II countries that are exempt from Pillar 3 (because they are
part of a consolidated group whose parent entity already fulfills the Pillar 3 requirements);
(ii) 69 banks reporting under IFRS but located in non-Basel II countries; and
(iii) 50 manufacturing, service, and insurance firms with substantive use of financial instruments.
The benchmark firms help us control for general trends and independent shocks to banks’ risk
disclosures. The sample period starts in 2005, two years before IFRS 7 became effective, and runs
through 2009, at which point Pillar 3 had been in place for at least a year. We construct two dis-
tinct yearly disclosure scores: (i) the Risk Disclosures score is the sum of 39 items required under
both IFRS 7 and Pillar 3—this measure represents the overlap between the two rules and serves
as the dependent variable in the disclosure tests, and (ii) the Fair Value Disclosures score is the
sum of 18 items required under IFRS 7 but not under Pillar 3—and serves as the time-varying
1. For instance, in Italy, the Bank of Italy is responsible for prudential supervision of the banking industry, while the
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB) conducts the securities market oversight. The Bank
of Italy’s primary goals are to ensure “sound and prudent bank management and the overall stability, efficiency,
and competitiveness of the financial system” (art. 5 of the Consolidated Law on Banking). CONSOB is responsible
for the regulation and control of securities markets, including accounting and auditing matters, and the supervision
of audit firms. Other countries like Spain or Greece have a similar institutional structure, while countries like
Belgium and Finland have a single unified regulator overseeing both areas (see the Appendix).
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control variable for changes in banks’ disclosures amid Pillar 3 adoption. In the market-based
tests, we use monthly bid-ask spreads as the dependent variable. Stock liquidity is well suited for
our purposes as it is quick moving and conceptually tied to a firm’s disclosure policy
(e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Verrecchia 2001). In a short-
window event study, we also use abnormal returns, volatility, and trading volume to test for the
immediate market reaction to the enhanced risk disclosures.
When we plot the aggregate Risk Disclosures scores, we find an increase in the year IFRS
7 became effective but yet another increase upon Pillar 3 adoption. No such pattern exists for the
Fair Value Disclosures. We confirm these results by estimating annual panel regressions. We find
that compliance with risk disclosure rules increases by up to 13 percentage points for all firms fol-
lowing IFRS 7 but that it increases by another 14 percentage points for regulated banks after Pil-
lar 3. The results hold when we control for concurrent changes in fair value disclosures, firm
attributes, and firm fixed effects plus country-by-year fixed effects. The latter mitigate concerns
about the influence of the global financial crisis that took place in the second half of our sample
period. We do not find an increase in Risk Disclosures for banks that are domiciled in Basel II
countries but exempt from Pillar 3 following its effective date, which alleviates concerns that
other provisions of the Basel II Accord (i.e., Pillars 1 and 2) contribute to the results.2 Our find-
ings are consistent with banks not being in full compliance with the new disclosure rules when
the securities market regulator acts as the primary supervisory body. Only after the same rules
were also monitored by the banking regulator did formal compliance levels reach 80% or more.
We next examine cross-sectional variation among Pillar 3 banks. First, we analyze country-
level differences and find that compliance with risk disclosure rules following IFRS 7 is higher
when the securities market regulator is an independent organizational unit (instead of a separate
department within a unified agency). In those countries, we also find that banks strengthen com-
pliance with Pillar 3 if the country’s central bank acts as their primary supervisor (instead of a
special financial services authority; Barth et al. 2006) and if the banking regulator has relatively
more supervisory resources at its disposal (Jackson and Roe 2009). This observed variation in
formal compliance suggests that a regulator’s will (i.e., its institutional design, resources, and
incentives) is crucial for the regulatory outcome in the presence of multiple supervisory agencies
and not just its industry focus, consistent with Agarwal et al. (2014) or Costello et al. (2019).3
When we analyze variation among regulated banks, we find that banks facing higher uncertainty
(measured by past stock return volatility) and with weaker past stock performance are more com-
pliant with Pillar 3. These findings suggest that banks most likely to attract regulatory scrutiny
from the banking supervisor are more forthcoming in their risk disclosures and point to the
importance of firm-level incentives for regulatory outcomes.
In the market-based tests, we find no significant liquidity reaction for the regulated banks
around IFRS 7 but a reduction in bid-ask spreads on the order of 12 to 17 percentage points fol-
lowing Pillar 3. These results hold after including firm and country-by-month fixed effects, which
effectively control for invariant (unobservable) firm attributes and local trends in liquidity. They
also hold when we limit the sample to the 13 months around the release of the initial Pillar 3 dis-
closures and are stronger when the Pillar 3 information is published in a separate report. This evi-
dence suggests that, on average, the enhanced risk disclosures only become material to investors
once the bank regulators start to play a dominant supervisory role. To gauge their short-term
2. Pillar 1 of the Basel II Accord tightens the capital adequacy requirements for banks (e.g., introduces model-based
risk-weights or includes operational risks). Pillar 2 requires banks to periodically assess their internal capital ade-
quacy as well as the supervisory agencies to monitor these assessments and intervene if necessary (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 2006).
3. We note that we only can test the sequence of adopting IFRS 7 followed by Pillar 3, and hence the banking regula-
tor is almost always second in the line of supervision (see also footnote 11). We therefore cannot preclude the pos-
sibility that our results are partly driven by a “doubling of efforts,” even though such reinforced monitoring would
not fully explain the cross-sectional variation that we observe.
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informativeness, we conduct an event study and find only modest abnormal returns, return volatil-
ity, and heightened trading volume in the three days around the initial release of the Pillar 3 dis-
closures but that the results vary with the amount of new information. This finding suggests that
markets likely need some time to fully interpret the enhanced risk disclosures.
Our study contributes to the literature on how the design of the oversight infrastructure
relates to firms’ compliance with new disclosure regulation. First, we show that there exists het-
erogeneity in firms’ responses to the same set of disclosure rules implemented and enforced by
different regulatory agencies. Independent regulators with more supervisory resources seem better
suited to impose the written rules, whereas firms fearing regulatory scrutiny are better at follow-
ing the rules. In contrast to Agarwal et al. (2014) and Costello et al. (2019), which also focus on
the banking sector but exploit the periodic rotation between industry-specific federal and state-
level agencies, we derive our insights from a setting in which two regulators—a general securities
market regulator and a specialized industry regulator—simultaneously share the supervisory tasks.
We show that banks increase their compliance with risk disclosure regulation, in form and sub-
stance, when they are under the auspices of the bank regulator as compared to the securities mar-
ket regulator. We do so for a regulation that is specifically geared toward improving market
discipline through disclosures (and not linked to banks’ capital requirements), which traditionally
aligns with the preferences of securities market regulators but not bank regulators
(Flannery 2020). Our evidence adds to findings of regulatory inconsistency in the implementation
and monitoring of laws in the presence of multiple supervisors (e.g., Berger et al. 2001; Macher
et al. 2011; Christensen et al. 2016).
Second, we document that regulatory outcomes are jointly determined by attributes of the
supervisory authority and the regulated firms. The presence of a regulator can improve formal
compliance with disclosure rules; however, it does not guarantee material implementation by the
regulated firms (e.g., Ball et al. 2003). Institutional features like stronger supervisory powers or
better resources also seem necessary to affect the materiality of the new risk disclosures, as do
firm-level reporting incentives (e.g., Jackson and Roe 2009; Christensen et al. 2013; Daske
et al. 2013; Bischof et al. 2021).
Finally, we add to the literature on the capital-market effects of corporate risk disclosures
(e.g., Jorion 2002; Bischof and Daske 2013; Campbell et al. 2014; Hope et al. 2016; Badia
et al. 2020) and provide a systematic assessment of the transparency effects of the Pillar 3 disclo-
sures for banks.
2. Conceptual underpinnings and institutional setting
Link between disclosure regulation, public enforcement, and compliance
Public enforcement implies that a supervisory agency imposes costly sanctions on firms that devi-
ate from intended reporting practices and thereby establishes economic incentives for firms to
apply a specific rule in the desired way (Shleifer 2005). On a more practical level, governments
define the mandate for a supervisory agency and determine its endowment with resources and
powers to achieve these goals. Sometimes, they prefer to assign a regulatory task not just to one
agency but to two separate agencies in parallel. These agencies share the responsibilities of over-
sight and enforcement. Such a structure can improve supervisory performance, as it offers protec-
tion against the failure of a single agency and likely mitigates the risk of one agency being
captured by its constituents (Freeman and Rossi 2012). On the flip side, the presence of multiple
regulators could create redundancies and increase coordination efforts (e.g., Martimort 1999;
Ting 2003; Krause and Douglas 2006).4
4. It could also lead to (desirable) competition among regulators or give rise to regulatory arbitrage, with regulated
firms opportunistically catering to one but not the other agency (Tiebout 1956; Parisi et al. 2006).
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We examine a setting in which a general securities market regulator and a specialized bank-
ing regulator jointly monitor the implementation of enhanced risk disclosure requirements for
banks. From a public-interest view of regulation (e.g., Pigou 1938; Posner 1974), the coexistence
of multiple regulators should not matter because both the securities market and banking regulator
pursue the overall well-being of financial markets and, specifically regarding Pillar 3, aim to
improve transparency and market discipline. Under this view, we would expect securities market
regulators to fully enforce, and banks to fully comply with, the new disclosure requirements as
soon as they become effective under IFRS 7. The later adoption of Pillar 3 should affect neither
formal nor material compliance with the rules.
However, prior literature has documented ample variation in the public enforcement of
accounting standards and disclosure regulation (e.g., Christensen et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2014).
This observation is more in line with the self-interest view of regulation (e.g., Stigler 1971;
Peltzman 1976), which suggests that regulatory agencies follow their own agenda. Similarly, if
multiple regulators bear responsibility, their enforcement activity has been shown to vary with the
extent of effort they are willing or able to spend (Rosen 2003), the degree of information asym-
metry between regulator and regulatee (Macher et al. 2011), or the regulatory strictness that they
apply (Agarwal et al. 2014; Costello et al. 2019). Supervisory agencies also might have little lati-
tude or no interest to push banks beyond formal compliance and force out material information,
in particular when the information could trigger adverse market reactions (Gallemore 2021).
Many of these factors driving heterogeneity in public enforcement are a function of the supervi-
sory powers and resources (e.g., Barth et al. 2006; Jackson and Roe 2009). Thus, under this view,
we expect a regulator’s institutional design, expertise, incentives, or resources (i.e., its “will”) to
matter and the regulatory outcomes of IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 to reflect imbalances along these
dimensions between the general securities market regulator and the specialized banking regulator.
If we assume that the banking regulator is better equipped in terms of staff, expertise, and
resources and has more interest in implementing the risk transparency rules, then we expect to
observe a more pronounced reaction in form and substance following Pillar 3 than IFRS 7.5
Firm-level incentives and factors specific to the regulated firms have the potential to reinforce
(or counteract) a regulator’s supervisory activities (e.g., Ball et al. 2003; Fisman and Miguel 2007;
Daske et al. 2013). In the banking industry, the relationship between the bank supervisor and the
regulated institution is particularly strained when a bank shows signs of financial distress. In such
an event, the survival of the bank is largely at the supervisor’s discretion (e.g., Brown and
Dinç 2005; Gallemore 2021), and banks could try to appease the regulator by proactively
increasing compliance. At the same time, the nature of written disclosure regulation often affords
firms with ample discretion even perfect enforcement cannot avoid (e.g., Auffhammer and
Kellogg 2011). Firms can then adopt a “check-the-box” approach and release statements that for-
mally meet the disclosure requirements yet do not convey insightful information because they are
boilerplate, highly aggregated, or overly complex (e.g., Dyer et al. 2017; Dong et al. 2019).
Against this backdrop, we expect banks that are in doubt about their future viability and fear reg-
ulatory or market scrutiny to increase their formal compliance with disclosure regulation, most
pronouncedly when they foresee regulatory actions by the banking supervisor which could harm
their ongoing operations.
5. We use different constructs to test for formal and material compliance. The analysis of banks’ actual disclosure
practices provides evidence of formal compliance with the new disclosure rules, whereas the liquidity analysis pro-
vides evidence on the materiality of these disclosures for investors (i.e., compliance in substance). However, we
note that risk disclosures—unlike other information typically examined in the literature—do not relate to informa-
tion about future expected cash flows but to the underlying risk of these cash flows. Such disclosures can reduce
information asymmetries and cost of capital by lowering the variance uncertainty premium that investors place on
firms (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003; Heinle and Smith 2017).
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Risk disclosures under IFRS 7 and the third pillar of the Basel II Accord
The IASB introduced IFRS 7 for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2007, with the pur-
pose of consolidating most of the existing disclosures on financial instruments as well as introduc-
ing new requirements.6 IFRS 7 superseded the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 30,
which was only applicable to banks, and also contains certain disclosure requirements already
required by IAS 32. IFRS 7 is not industry-specific and is mandatory for all firms holding finan-
cial instruments. Firms could voluntarily adopt IFRS 7 one year ahead of schedule. The risk dis-
closures under IFRS 7 form an integral part of the audited footnotes to firms’ financial statements.
Yet they only constitute a small portion of the disclosures to be audited and, hence, potentially
lack materiality for triggering a qualified audit opinion (or an enforcement action by the securities
market regulator).
The Basel II Accord is a supranational agreement on the capital regulation of banks. The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) first published the accord in 2004 and rec-
ommended that its member states transpose the guidelines into national banking laws. The BCBS
structured the accord around three pillars. The first two cover the minimum capital requirements
and the supervisory review process; the third one introduces requirements about risk disclosures.
Most of these risk disclosures were already privately made available to the bank supervisors
through the ongoing regulatory filing process. Thus, the primary goal of Pillar 3 is not to improve
the information available to prudential supervisors but to enhance publicly available information
(Basel II Accord, para. 809). In that sense, the objectives are very similar to IFRS 7 as Pillar 3 is
aimed at establishing market discipline (e.g., Flannery 2001; Herring 2004). Pillar 3 does not pre-
scribe a standardized disclosure format. Banks can publish a separate Pillar 3 report or integrate
the disclosures in the annual report. The standard emphasizes that banks can meet the Pillar
3 requirements even without additional disclosures when they already provide the information
under local accounting standards or regulations (Basel II Accord, para. 814). A bank’s external
auditor typically does not attest compliance with Pillar 3 unless the disclosures are an integral part
of the financial statements.
The IASB and the BCBS developed IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 independently but coordinated their
efforts; the BCBS participated in IASB advisory groups and commented publicly on the IFRS
7 exposure draft. In terms of substance, the Pillar 3 disclosure items are very similar to the
respective items under IFRS 7. Table 1, panel A, in section 3 provides a mapping of the disclo-
sure items that are common between Pillar 3 and IFRS 7.7 The two rule makers expressly
acknowledge the overlap and, when issuing IFRS 7, the IASB commented: “This guidance is
consistent with the disclosure requirements for banks developed by the Basel Committee (known
as Pillar 3), so that banks can prepare, and users receive, a single coordinated set of disclosures
about financial risk” (IFRS 7.BC41). Once IFRS 7 and the Basel II regulations were published,
legislators had to transpose them into national law and ensure proper oversight (with no role for
the IASB or the BCBS). Some countries split the oversight charge between the local securities
market regulator for IFRS 7 and the local banking regulator for Pillar 3 (e.g., Australia), whereas
in other countries (e.g., Denmark) both functions are combined in a single agency (sometimes
with multiple internal units). In the Appendix, we list the supervisory agencies responsible for the
enforcement of IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 and indicate the sources of this information.
To better understand the institutional forces at work, we conduct an in-depth analysis for four
sample countries (see supporting information in section 2 of the online Appendix for details). We
6. One other standard that still requires certain disclosures related to financial instruments is IAS 1 (specifically about
a firm’s regulatory capital management).
7. We use this mapping to construct our Risk Disclosures score. The table also lists the earlier IAS preceding IFRS
7 and, in panel B, the disclosure items that are unique to IFRS 7. For examples of banks’ actual disclosures under
IFRS 7 and Pillar 3, see section 1 of supporting information in the online Appendix, as an addition to the online
article.
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identify several main insights from this analysis. Regulators mostly limit their attention to the
enforcement of the disclosure regime to which they are legally bound. We find little evidence of
institutionalized harmonization of efforts or information sharing across agencies. Enforcement
of IFRS 7 is generally stricter when bank and securities market regulators are separate. One
explanation could be that under unified supervision, the prudential perspective (Flannery 2020)
seems to dominate accounting and transparency enforcement. The monitoring of Pillar 3 is part
of the ongoing review process, and bank regulators usually require strict formal compliance. As a
result, they view published financial statements primarily as inputs for their prudential risk assess-
ment. Imbalances of powers are also deemed important for guiding an agency’s regulatory efforts,
and, typically, the banking regulator is better equipped with resources, expertise, and possible
sanctions.
In terms of timeline, the BCBS expected its member states to implement Basel II from 2007
onwards (Basel II, para. 2). Most developed economies adhered to this schedule.8 For instance,
the European Union introduced Basel II in 2007 but allowed for a transition period until 2008.
Other countries followed in 2009 (e.g., United Arab Emirates) or later. Some countries chose to
only implement Pillars 1 and 2 and postpone Pillar 3 (e.g., Russia) or to completely skip its adop-
tion.9 The main factors influencing the adoption timing of Basel II were the length of the national
legislative process and the ability of local supervisors and banks to implement the sophisticated
capital regulation under Pillar 1. Figure 1 illustrates the staggered adoption pattern on a monthly
basis for both IFRS 7 and Pillar 7 for our sample firms. As the graph shows, the bulk of the initial
IFRS 7 disclosures became available in the first six months of 2008 (reflecting a December 2007
fiscal year-end). The release of the Pillar 3 reports is more dispersed, starting as early as February






























2008/10 2009/1 2009/4 2009/7 2009/10
Notes: The figure illustrates the staggered adoption pattern of IFRS 7 and Pillar 3. It depicts the monthly
frequency of the first-time release of the new risk disclosures under the two regulations for our sample firms.
8. In Kuwait, Basel II (and Pillar 3) became effective in 2006.
9. For instance, the Central Bank of Jordan justifies its decision not to implement Pillar 3 as follows:
“[We] considered the adoption of IFRS 7 as being equivalent to compliance with Pillar 3 of Basel II, noting that all
banks in Jordan are compliant with IFRS 7” (Financial Stability Institute 2014, 12).
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2007 but with the majority being published in 2008 and 2009. We exploit the staggered adoption
of the two regulations to improve our identification in the empirical tests.
3. Research design and data
Identification strategy and empirical model
We build the identification strategy of our main tests on the following key features: (i) the estima-
tion of panel regressions with yearly risk disclosure scores or monthly bid-ask spreads as the
dependent variable, (ii) the use of various benchmark samples, and (iii) the staggered adoption of
IFRS 7 and Pillar 3. Combined, these features allow us to implement a generalized DiD design.
Figure 2 provides a schematic overview of our identification strategy.
The use of benchmark samples lets us control for general time trends or market-wide changes
(e.g., macroeconomic shocks such as the financial crisis) that are concurrent with but unrelated to
the regulatory change. As the figure shows, we use three distinct groups of firms that report under
IFRS 7 but do not have to comply with Pillar 3. Specifically, we include banks domiciled in
Basel II countries but exempt from Pillar 3 because they are part of a consolidated group whose
parent entity already publishes a Pillar 3 report. These banks are subject to the same institutional
and economic forces (and, notably, also have to adopt Pillars 1 and 2) and fall under the same
oversight regime as the treatment banks. We further include large industrial, service, and insur-
ance firms located in Basel II countries with substantive financial instrument exposure. Their
reporting incentives should be similar to the Pillar 3 banks. Finally, we include banks domiciled
in countries that did not sign the Basel II Accord to help control for industry-specific trends.
We code the staggered rollout of both IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 based on the first fiscal year a firm
applies the respective risk disclosure rules. IFRS 7 became effective for fiscal years beginning on
January 1, 2007, at the earliest. Only very few banks voluntarily adopted IFRS 7 in 2005 or
2006. The introduction of Pillar 3 varied across Basel II countries. Most countries required the
Figure 2 Schematic overview of IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 adoption types [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
types
Notes: The figure illustrates our identification strategy for the disclosure analyses. We define IFRS 7 and
Pillar 3 as binary indicator variables that are equal to one beginning in the first year a firm applies the risk
disclosure rules under IFRS 7 or the third pillar of the Basel II Accord and zero otherwise. Aside from the
treatment group of banks subject to Pillar 3, the sample includes the following benchmark firms: (i) banks
domiciled in Basel II countries but exempt from Pillar 3 (e.g., subsidiaries of a parent entity that already
publishes a Pillar 3 report), (ii) nonbanks in Basel II countries (i.e., industrial, service, and insurance firms),
and (iii) banks domiciled in countries that did not sign the Basel II Accord.
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regulatory risk disclosures for fiscal years beginning in 2008 or 2009, with a few requiring
the disclosures in 2007. In the liquidity tests, we can apply a finer coding scheme based on the
actual month when a firm, for the first time, released the risk disclosures under IFRS 7 or Pillar
3 (see Figure 1 for the resulting adoption time-series pattern).10 The staggered rollout lets us
include time fixed effects in the model, which we allow to vary by country in some specifications.
These time fixed effects effectively control for common trends and shocks in a period (and coun-
try); most importantly, they control for the effects of the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009.
As a result, the identification stems from the within-sample variation in the adoption timing of
the new rules.11
Combining the above features, we examine the impact of IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 on banks’
actual risk disclosures by estimating the following OLS regression model:





βi Fixed Effectsiþ ε: ð1Þ
The dependent variable is a self-constructed Risk Disclosures score measuring a firm’s com-
pliance with the overlap of the IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 disclosure requirements. Specifically, we iden-
tify 39 distinct disclosure items that are required both under IFRS 7 and the third pillar of the
Basel II Accord (see Table 1, panel A). We assign a score of one for each disclosure item
reported by a firm in a fiscal year and divide the sum by 39 so that the total score ranges from
zero (noncompliance or lack of applicability) to one (full compliance).12 Importantly, and unlike
typical proxies of disclosure quality, our measure is relatively free of bias and error as we are
simply focusing on the presence of certain disclosure items but do not judge their content and,
hence, the quality of a firm’s risk disclosures.13 For details on the construction of the Risk Disclo-
sures variable (and reporting examples), see supporting information in section 1 of the online
Appendix.
Our main variables of interest are two binary indicators that are equal to one beginning in the
first fiscal year a firm is subject to the risk disclosure rules under IFRS 7 or Pillar 3 and zero oth-
erwise. Because all sample firms adopt IFRS 7 at some point, this variable represents a pre–post
comparison. To allow for DiD estimation, we include a separate indicator for the Benchmark
Firms (and its interaction with IFRS 7). Pillar 3 then compares the Risk Disclosures following
Pillar 3 adoption to the pre-period and the disclosure changes among the benchmark firms.
10. We determine the release date of the respective reports as the earliest of (i) the publication date indicated on the cor-
porate website (e.g., in a press release), (ii) the filing date on Thomson Reuters or S&P Global Market Intelligence,
or (iii) the file properties of the downloaded annual report or Pillar 3 report.
11. With the exception of Kuwait, all sample countries introduced IFRS 7 either at the same time or before Pillar
3. Thus, we have to interpret our results as conditional on this particular ordering. Canada (not in our sample)
would be an example of a reverse ordering because the IFRS mandate did not take effect until 2011, while Pil-
lar 3 was adopted in 2008. Yet, the Accounting Standards Board of Canada harmonized Canadian GAAP with
IFRS ahead of time and introduced Section 3862 (which is essentially identical to IFRS 7) simultaneously with
Pillar 3. Consistently, we do not find changes in the Risk Disclosures score for a subset of Canadian firms
in 2011.
12. To mitigate concerns about the dependent variable being bounded between zero and one, we repeat the ana-
lyses (i) using a generalized linear model (GLM) regression to estimate the fractional response in the Risk Dis-
closures score (Papke and Wooldridge 1996) or (ii) with a logit transformed Risk Disclosures score as the
dependent variable (i.e., ln[x/(1–x)]). We also (iii) scale the yearly sum of the disclosure items by the maximum
score for each firm to account for the fact that not all items apply to each firm (e.g., Tier 1 capital is only avail-
able for banks). In all three cases, the results are largely similar to those reported, and none of the inferences
change.
13. The manual coding of quantitative disclosures is straightforward, and we always assign a score of one if a bank pro-
vides the required (disaggregated) numbers. For qualitative disclosures, we ignore overly general statements without
any firm-specific information content that would allow comparisons with other entities.
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Controlsj denotes a set of firm-level control variables. Among other things, we explicitly con-
trol for contemporaneous changes in firms’ disclosure behavior around Pillar 3 adoption. We
construct a Fair Value Disclosures score comprising 18 disclosure items required under IFRS
7 but not Pillar 3.14 For this score, Pillar 3 does not duplicate existing disclosure requirements of
IFRS 7, and hence it serves as a firm-specific, time-varying control variable of disclosure prac-
tices. Fixed Effectsi represents year, country, country-by-year, or firm fixed effects. In all our
tests, we draw statistical inferences based on standard errors clustered by country.
For the liquidity analyses, we adjust the regression model in equation (1) as follows:





βi Fixed Effectsiþ ε: ð2Þ
The monthly median of daily quoted Bid-Ask Spreads serves as the dependent variable. This mea-
sure is a commonly used proxy of information asymmetry and market liquidity (e.g., Leuz and
Verrecchia 2000; Daske et al. 2008). The definition of IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 is similar as before,
but now the IFRS 7 indicator is equal to one beginning in the first month a firm releases its
annual financial report, whereas the Pillar 3 indicator is equal to one beginning in the first month
a firm releases its Pillar 3 report (see Figure 1). Controlsj denotes a set of firm-specific factors
related to liquidity. The model includes firm, month, or country-by-month fixed effects, and,
when the benchmark firms are part of the sample, we estimate the time fixed effects separately
for banks and nonbanks. We cluster the standard errors by country.
Sample selection and description
Our sample starts in 2005, two years before IFRS 7 became effective, and runs through 2009.
Table 2, panel A, summarizes the sample selection process. We start by compiling all publicly
listed banks with data available in BvD Bankscope (based on the fiscal year 2008). Next, we limit
the sample to countries with mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 to avoid the confounding effects
of a change in accounting standards during the sample period. We search the websites of the
577 banks that satisfy these criteria for an English version of the consolidated IFRS financial
statements and, if applicable, a separate document containing the Pillar 3 disclosures. We need these
files to construct the disclosure scores. This procedure yields a sample of 216 banks, of which
147 are from Basel II countries, and the remaining 69 banks are part of the benchmark sample. In
Basel II countries, 28 banks are exempt from Pillar 3.15 We complement the benchmark sample
with 50 large industrial, service, and insurance firms from Basel II countries.16 We require these
nonbanks to have a financial instruments-to-total assets ratio of at least 30% so that their reporting
incentives are sufficiently comparable to those of banks. The final sample comprises 266 individual
firms, giving rise to a maximum of 1,220 firm-year observations with data available. For the liquid-
ity analyses, we lose 42 firms (17 from Basel II countries) because of missing market data. The
liquidity sample comprises a maximum of 10,569 firm-month observations.
In panel B (Basel II countries) and panel C (benchmark countries) of Table 2, we provide a
breakdown of the sample composition and IFRS 7/Pillar 3 adoption patterns by country and year.
14. We label the score Fair Value Disclosures but acknowledge that it also includes items like the maturity of financial
assets and liabilities or hedging and derivatives trading. See panel B of Table 1 for details.
15. Pillar 3, in principle, also applies to nonlisted banks, which could report under IFRS. A preliminary analysis shows
that out of the more than 1,100 nonlisted banks in BvD Bankscope from Basel II countries, only about 500 have
IFRS reports since 2005. Of those banks, the vast majority is exempt from Pillar 3 or does not satisfy the sample
criteria, especially because the reports are rarely made available in English.
16. To ensure adequate geographic dispersion, we choose the nonbanks as the largest firms (based on total assets) from
each of five regions in Compustat Global. This procedure yields 7 firms from Northern Europe, 21 from Central
Europe, 6 from Southern Europe, 7 from the Middle East, and 9 from the Asia-Pacific region.
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TABLE 2
Sample selection and composition
Panel A: Overview of sample selection process







Number of listed banks (BvD Bankscope) 877 1,005 1,882
Less: countries without IFRS mandate (445) (860) (1,305)
Number of listed IFRS banks 432 145 577
Less: banks without IFRS report in English (164) (76) (240)
Less: banks without Pillar 3 report in English (117) — (117)
Less: firms with missing control variables (4) — (4)
Bank sample 147 69 216
Plus: nonbanks as additional benchmark 50 — 50
Total sample (disclosure analysis) 197 69 266
Less: firms with missing liquidity data (17) (25) (42)
Total sample (liquidity analysis) 180 44 224





First-time adopters of IFRS 7/





3 banks2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sum
Australia 0/0 0/0 1/0 13/7 0/0 14/7 6 1
Austria 0/0 0/0 2/0 0/0 0/0 2/0 0 2
Bahrain 0/0 0/0 9/0 0/9 0/0 9/9 0 0
Belgium 0/0 0/0 2/1 0/1 0/0 2/2 0 0
Cyprus 0/0 0/0 4/1 0/3 0/0 4/4 0 0
Denmark 0/0 1/0 5/3 0/0 0/0 6/3 3 0
Finland 0/0 0/0 2/1 0/1 0/0 2/2 0 0
France 0/0 0/0 9/0 0/4 0/0 9/4 5 0
Germany 0/0 0/0 16/1 1/5 0/0 17/6 7 4
Greece 0/0 0/0 6/0 0/4 0/0 6/4 0 2
Hong Kong 0/0 0/0 13/10 0/0 0/0 13/10 3 0
Ireland 0/0 0/0 3/0 1/3 0/1 4/4 0 0
Italy 0/0 1/0 8/0 0/4 0/0 9/4 4 1
Kuwait 0/0 0/4 9/0 0/0 0/2 9/6 3 0
Liechtenstein 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/1 0/0 1/1 0 0
Lithuania 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0 1
Malta 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/2 0/0 3/2 0 1
Mauritius 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 0/0 2/2 0 0
Netherlands 1/0 0/0 3/0 0/3 0/0 4/3 0 1
Norway 0/0 1/0 2/0 0/1 0/0 3/1 1 1
Oman 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 1/1 0 0
Poland 0/0 0/0 10/2 0/0 0/1 10/3 0 7
Portugal 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/1 0/0 1/1 0 0
Romania 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0 1
Saudi Arabia 0/0 0/0 7/0 0/7 0/0 7/7 0 0
Singapore 0/0 0/0 3/0 0/3 0/0 3/3 0 0
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 2 (continued)





First-time adopters of IFRS 7/





3 banks2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sum
Slovakia 0/0 0/0 3/0 0/0 0/0 3/0 0 3
South Africa 0/0 0/0 3/0 2/4 0/0 5/4 0 1
Spain 0/0 1/0 5/0 0/3 0/0 6/3 2 1
Sweden 0/0 0/0 5/2 0/0 0/0 5/2 3 0
Switzerland 0/0 0/0 9/1 0/4 0/0 9/5 4 0
United Arab Emirates 0/0 0/0 10/0 0/0 0/5 10/5 4 1
United Kingdom 0/0 1/0 15/2 0/9 0/0 16/11 5 0
Total 1/0 6/4 170/25 20/81 0/9 197/119 50 28
Panel C: Sample composition and disclosure adoption patterns for benchmark countries
Adoption pattern
Benchmark countries
(Non-Pillar 3 banks only)
First-time adopters of IFRS 7 disclosure requirements
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Sum
Barbados 0 0 0 1 0 1
China 0 0 10 0 0 10
Croatia 0 0 2 0 0 2
Georgia 0 0 1 0 0 1
Iceland 0 0 2 0 0 2
Jamaica 0 0 1 2 0 3
Jordan 0 0 10 0 0 10
Kazakhstan 0 0 6 0 0 6
Kenya 0 0 1 0 0 1
Lebanon 0 0 2 0 0 2
Moldova 0 0 1 0 0 1
Qatar 0 0 4 0 0 4
Russia 0 0 9 0 0 9
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 0 0 2 0 2
Serbia 0 0 1 0 0 1
Togo 0 0 1 0 0 1
Turkey 0 0 13 0 0 13
Total 0 0 64 5 0 69
Notes: The table provides an overview of the sample selection process (panel A) and indicates the number of indi-
vidual firms plus the year when they started applying IFRS 7 or Pillar 3 reporting for Basel II countries (panel B)
and non-Basel II countries (panel C). The sample comprises 216 publicly listed banks (with data available in BvD
Bankscope) and 50 representative nonbanks (with data available in Compustat Global) from 50 countries with
mandatory IFRS reporting over the 2005 to 2009 period. We only include firms for which we are able to obtain
English-language annual reports under IFRS and, if applicable, Pillar 3 reports to compute the Risk Disclosures
score and the Fair Value Disclosures score. The non-Pillar 3 banks domiciled in Basel II countries are exempt
from Pillar 3 disclosures (e.g., because they are subsidiaries of a parent entity that already publishes a Pillar 3
report). We select the 50 nonbanks as the largest industrial, service, or insurance firms (based on total assets) that
have a financial instruments-to-total assets ratio of at least 30% and are domiciled in Basel II countries.
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The panels show that no country dominates the sample, with Germany having the largest number
of IFRS 7 firms (17) and the United Kingdom having the largest group of Pillar 3 banks (11).
234 of the 266 sample firms adopt IFRS 7 in 2007, while 81 of 119 eligible banks switch to Pillar
3 reporting in 2008.
In Table 3, we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses.
The two disclosure scores, Risk Disclosures and Fair Value Disclosures, reveal ample variation
with an interquartile range of 0.359 and 0.228, respectively. In the disclosure analyses, we
include the following firm-specific control variables (see, e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993;
Dechow et al. 2010): we measure firm size by Total Assets, a firm’s information environment by
the number of analysts covering the firm (Analyst Following), leverage by the Capital Ratio, prof-
itability by Return on Assets, and future growth prospects by Asset Growth. In the liquidity ana-
lyses, we follow prior literature (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Daske et al. 2008) and include
Market Value, the monthly median of daily Share Turnover, and Return Variability measured by
the standard deviation of daily stock returns as controls. We also include the absolute value of
monthly Abnormal Stock Returns (based on a simple market model) to control for contemporane-
ous performance. We estimate the liquidity regressions in a log-linear form with the natural loga-
rithm of the dependent and control variables and lag the control variables by 12 months to
control for seasonal trends (except for Abnormal Stock Return). See the table notes for more
details on data sources and variable measurement.
4. Results of disclosure tests
Graphical analyses of changes in risk disclosures following IFRS 7 and Pillar 3
We begin with graphically plotting firms’ risk disclosure behavior over the years 2005 to 2009
and present results in Figure 3. The graphs distinguish among (i) banks in Basel II countries that
started complying with Pillar 3 in 2007, 2008, or 2009;17 (ii) benchmark banks exempt from
Pillar 3 or in non-Basel II countries; and (iii) nonbanks.
Panel A plots the Risk Disclosures score. We observe essentially no change in Risk Disclo-
sures leading up to IFRS 7. The flat pattern in the years 2005 and 2006 indicates that firms did
not voluntarily preempt the pending rule change. It also mitigates concerns about the parallel-
trends assumption underlying our DiD design. The figure shows that all firms exhibit a substantial
increase in Risk Disclosures upon adoption of IFRS 7 in 2007. For instance, both benchmark and
Pillar 3 banks start off with an initial disclosure level of about 30% to 40% and increase their Risk
Disclosures by 20 to 30 percentage points. Nonbanks exhibit an increase of about 10 percentage
points. Notably, the treatment banks display yet another increase when they initially adopt Pillar
3, widening the gap between treatment banks and benchmark firms. This additional increase in
risk disclosures once Pillar 3 becomes effective is similar for adoption periods in 2007, 2008, and
2009. By the end of the sample period, Risk Disclosures of the Pillar 3 banks reach a compliance
level of about 75% and surpass the benchmark banks by up to 20 percentage points. The
nonbanks exhibit a substantially lower level of Risk Disclosures before and after IFRS 7, likely
due to their different nature of business.
Panel B plots the Fair Value Disclosures score and highlights the importance of controlling
for contemporaneous trends in firms’ disclosure behavior. The graph reveals a general upward
trend in Fair Value Disclosures by about 15 percentage points over the sample period. However,
no distinct patterns or spikes for individual groups are apparent, except for the difference in levels
between banks and nonbanks, and the 2006 increase for the nine sample banks that adopted Pillar
3 in 2009. Thus, the disclosure changes we observe around IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 seem attributable
to the differential enforcement level of the two regulations and do not extend to other reporting
areas.
17. Because of their low number, we do not separately plot the Pillar 3 banks that adopted in 2006.
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Figure 3 Risk Disclosures score and Fair Value Disclosures score over time
Nonbanks
Nonbanks
Notes: The figure plots the time-series of the Risk Disclosures score (panel A) and the Fair Value
Disclosures score (panel B) by various types of Pillar 3 adoption firms. For details on the calculation of the
two scores, see Table 1. The sample comprises all firm-years from 234 banks and nonbanks over the 2005 to
2009 period that adopted IFRS 7 in 2007 (see also Table 2). The different Pillar 3 adoption types are
(i) banks domiciled in Basel II countries that adopt Pillar 3 in either 2007, 2008, or 2009; (ii) benchmark
banks that are exempt from Pillar 3 requirements or domiciled in non-Basel II countries; and (iii) nonbanks
in Basel II countries (i.e., industrial, service, and insurance firms). Because of the low number, we do not
separately plot the scores of banks that adopt Pillar 3 in 2006.
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Regression analyses of changes in risk disclosures following IFRS 7 and Pillar 3
To test these patterns more formally, we estimate various specifications of equation (1) and report
the results in Table 4. Moving from left to right, we start with a basic DiD estimation that
includes the Benchmark Firms variable and the Fair Value Disclosures score to account for con-
current trends in disclosures (plus country and year fixed effects).18 We next add the additional
firm-level controls in model (2) and replace the country fixed effects with firm fixed effects in
model (3). Given that our sample period partly overlaps with the global financial crisis, which hits
countries at different points in time and affects them to a different degree, a concern is that this
market turmoil changes banks’ disclosure incentives and increases demand for risk information.
We therefore replace the year fixed effects with country-by-year fixed effects in model (4), which
accounts for the average change in risk disclosures in a country and year including the portion
driven by an economy’s exposure to the financial crisis. To the same end, in model (5), we drop
all observations from the crisis years 2008 and 2009 from the sample.
The tenor of the results is very similar across these five specifications. The IFRS 7 coefficient
is always positive and significant, suggesting that compliance with risk disclosure rules increases
by up to 13 percentage points following IFRS 7 adoption for all firms. The effect is no different
for Pillar 3 banks and benchmark firms as generally the interaction term between IFRS 7 and
Benchmark Firms is insignificant. Only when we include country-by-year fixed effects in model
(4) is the interaction significantly negative. The negative and significant main effects of Bench-
mark Firms in models (1) and (2) capture the generally lower level of Risk Disclosures by bench-
mark firms, which include nonbanks. More to the point, the coefficient on Pillar 3 is positive and
significant throughout and indicates an incremental increase in Risk Disclosures by 14 to 16 per-
centage points upon Pillar 3 adoption. These results prevail when using firm fixed effects and
explicitly controlling for the impact of the financial crisis in models (4) and (5).
Another concern is that the results for Pillar 3 are affected by institutional or economic
changes closely aligned with the adoption of the risk disclosures—that is, the implementation of
Pillars 1 and 2 of the Basel II Accord. To address this concern, we reestimate equation (1) but
limit the sample to the 97 benchmark banks and replace Pillar 3 with a Pseudo Pillar 3 indicator
that is equal to one for all local benchmark banks beginning in the year when Pillar 3 reporting
becomes mandatory for the treatment banks in that country, and zero otherwise. That is, this vari-
able is coded as one only for the 28 banks domiciled in Basel II countries that are exempt from
Pillar 3 reporting (but not from implementing Pillars 1 and 2). As the results in model (6) show,
the coefficient on Pseudo Pillar 3 is insignificant (and negative). Thus, we find no indication that
concurrent changes in the local environment of our treatment banks or their adoption of Pillars
1 and 2 affect the documented increase in their risk disclosures after Pillar 3 becomes effective.
In sum, the results reveal uneven compliance among firms over time. Regulated banks are
less than fully compliant with the new risk disclosure rules when the securities market regulator
acts as the primary supervisory body. Only after the banking regulator becomes responsible for
the monitoring of similar disclosure rules, banks attain higher compliance levels and get closer to
full compliance. Put differently, the evidence suggests that having multiple regulators in charge
of implementation and enforcement creates heterogeneity in the timing and extent of regulated
firms’ compliance with the written rules.
Heterogeneity in the compliance with risk disclosure rules
We next examine cross-sectional variation in the compliance with risk disclosure rules among
Pillar 3 banks. To do so, we extend the OLS model in equation (1) by interacting both the IFRS
7 and Pillar 3 indicators with binary partitioning variables that we compute on either the country
18. In untabulated sensitivity tests, we replace the year fixed effects with linear or nonlinear trend variables and obtain
very similar results to those reported.
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level or firm level. These partitioning variables allow us to examine whether the compliance with
risk disclosure rules systematically varies across subsets of Pillar 3 banks. That is, the coefficients
on the interaction terms provide an estimate of the marginal change in Risk Disclosures for banks
with a partitioning variable equal to one relative to banks with a partitioning variable equal to
zero after they have adopted IFRS 7 and Pillar 3, respectively. We estimate the same general
model as in Table 4, column (3), and hence the firm fixed effects subsume the main effects of the
partitioning variables.19 We run the cross-sectional analyses only for the treatment banks because
we are interested in differences in risk disclosures among the banks affected by Pillar 3. As a
result, the Benchmark Firms variable (and its interaction with IFRS 7) drops from the model.
Table 5, panel A, reports by-country descriptive statistics on the various partitioning vari-
ables that we use. We create three partitioning variables on the country level. First, in column (1),
we code countries with two separate regulatory bodies for the oversight of securities markets and
banks versus countries where the two areas are overseen by a single entity (see also the
Appendix). The idea is to examine if this distinct setup has an effect on regulatory outcomes. On
the one hand, the coexistence of two separate agencies could increase competition (e.g., for
funding or attention) as both agencies have to justify their presence. On the other hand, they both
could try to curry favor with their constituents or rely on the other party to take a leading role in
the enforcement of the new rules, giving rise to a free-rider problem. In column (2), we identify
those countries among the jurisdictions with separate regulators in which the central bank
(i.e., the institution responsible for the monetary policy) acts as the primary banking supervisor.
Because central banks that perform all functions of prudential oversight including bank supervi-
sion are typically well staffed and funded, the imbalance of powers is likely larger relative to a
separate securities market regulator. In column (3), we develop a more direct measure of the rela-
tive strength of supervisory resources (e.g., Jackson and Roe 2009) and compare the full-time
staff members available for banking versus general securities market regulation. We split the
countries by the sample median, and a partitioning variable of one indicates that a country dedi-
cates relatively more resources to the (separate) banking regulator. Because the country-level fac-
tors are time independent, we interact both the IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 variables with the same
partitioning indicator.
We also create three firm-level partitioning variables. We use a bank’s Return Variability,
measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year, and annual buy-
and-hold Stock Price Performance in columns (4) and (5). Banks with more volatile stock prices
and lower stock returns likely face more market pressure and regulatory scrutiny. Similarly, banks
with a lower Tier 1 Capital Ratio are perceived as riskier and more likely to draw the attention of
the bank regulator (column (6)). To create the respective high or low indicators, we separately
compare the firm-level values in the year of IFRS 7 adoption and the year of Pillar 3 adoption to
the sample median. That is, we code a first partitioning variable for IFRS 7 that is conditioned on
the year IFRS 7 took effect, and a second partitioning variable for Pillar 3 conditioned on when
Pillar 3 was adopted. This coding of two indicators allows us to separately examine the market
pressure and regulatory scrutiny at the time of each regulatory change. The table notes provide
further detail on the data sources and variable measurement of our partitioning variables.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results from the cross-sectional tests. We only tabulate the var-
iables of interest, but the full set of controls plus year and firm fixed effects are included in the
regressions. Column (1) shows the results for separate regulators. Only when the securities market
regulator is an independent unit do banks increase their risk disclosures following IFRS 7 adop-
tion, as can be seen from the significant interaction term. Around Pillar 3 adoption, no such dis-
tinction exists. This evidence suggests that independent securities market regulators engage in
stricter enforcement, consistent with potentially beneficial effects of two separate supervisory
19. When we use firm-level attributes to create partitioning variables, we also include the respective raw values of the
firm attributes as controls in the models.
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agencies coexisting side-by-side. Columns (2) and (3) show the results for imbalances of power.
Respectively, compliance with risk disclosure requirements is higher after Pillar 3 adoption when
the banking regulator is part of the central bank and has relatively more resources at its disposal.
Overall, the results are consistent with the self-interest view of regulation and suggest that a regu-
lator’s “will” (i.e., its institutional design, resources, and incentives) are crucial for the outcome
of the regulatory process.20
The next three columns show the results for the firm-level partitions. Banks whose stock
prices are more volatile and perform worse during the year of Pillar 3 adoption seem more com-
pliant with the new risk disclosure rules. In both columns (4) and (5), the interaction with Pillar
3 is positive and statistically significant. The reaction around the implementation of IFRS 7 points
in the same direction but is not significant. Column (6) reports results for our split based on
banks’ capital ratios. The interaction with Pillar 3 is positive but insignificant. Our evidence sug-
gests that economically weaker banks are more responsive to disclosure rules under the oversight
of the banking regulator, consistent with the idea that they face more market pressure and foresee
tighter scrutiny by the supervisory agency charged with prudential oversight. More generally, our
results indicate that firm-level reporting incentives prevail even in the presence of multiple
regulators.
5. Results of liquidity and market tests
Regression analyses of changes in liquidity following IFRS 7 and Pillar 3
In this section, we conduct tests of bid-ask spreads to assess the materiality of the enhanced risk
disclosures. The implicit assumption is that only substantive compliance with risk disclosure rules
is tantamount to providing decision-relevant information to investors. If firms were purely com-
plying by the book without adjusting the information content of their disclosures, we would not
expect information asymmetry among investors to decrease. To test this relation, we estimate var-
ious specifications of equation (2) and report the results in Table 6.
Moving from left to right, we start with the full sample and include the firm-level controls
plus firm and month fixed effects (separately for banks and nonbanks) in model (1). The inclusion
of monthly fixed effects is possible because we exploit the staggered rollout of actual risk disclo-
sures under the two regulations in the coding of IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 (see Figure 1). In model (2),
we allow the monthly fixed effects to vary by country, which lets us flexibly account for contem-
poraneous shocks and trends in the liquidity data—most notably, the average effects of the finan-
cial crisis on all banks in a country and month. Model (3) repeats this estimation but limits the
sample to the treatment banks. We find consistent results across the three columns. The coeffi-
cients on Pillar 3 are always negative and significant, indicating a reduction in bid-ask spreads on
the order of 12 to 17 percentage points after Pillar 3.21 This effect is economically significant but
not too large to be implausible. We find no comparable liquidity benefits following the implemen-
tation of IFRS 7 as seen by the insignificant coefficients on IFRS 7. This finding suggests that the
increase in Risk Disclosures around IFRS 7 was not informative enough for investors to revise
their priors, and it was only after the banking regulators became responsible for the enforcement
that the risk disclosures conveyed new and material information to them.
20. In additional analyses (not tabulated), we also partition the sample by the median of the Rule of Law index from
Kaufmann et al. (2010). This variable is often used in the IFRS literature to proxy for the general quality of the reg-
ulatory environment (e.g., Landsman et al. 2012; Christensen et al. 2013). We find no evidence that general legal
quality explains the variation in Risk Disclosures among Pillar 3 banks, which increases our confidence in the
bank-specific proxies that we use.
21. We compute the percentage effects for the bid-ask spreads as (e0.123–1) = 0.116 and (e0.183–1) = 0.167. For
comparison, Christensen et al. (2013, 165) report average reductions in bid-ask spreads around mandatory IFRS
adoption in the EU on the order of 17% to 35%.
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We perform three additional tests to substantiate our evidence that the results are attributable
to Pillar 3. In model (4), we limit the sample to the 13-month window surrounding banks’ initial
release of their Pillar 3 disclosures, centered on the release month. Because some banks publish
the Pillar 3 disclosures in a standalone report and release it in a different month than they
publish the regular annual report, we can control for the latter.22 Specifically, we create an Annual
Report indicator that is equal to one beginning in the month the bank releases this document, and
zero otherwise, and include it in the model. As the results show, we only find a significant reduc-
tion in bid-ask spreads following the release of the risk disclosures but not after the publication of
the annual report. In model (5), we limit the sample to the 66 treatment banks that publish the Pil-
lar 3 disclosures in a separate report instead of integrating them in their regular financial state-
ments and estimate a reduced form of equation (2). The coefficient on Pillar 3 is significantly
negative and larger in size than in our full sample. We repeat this analysis for the 48 banks with
combined Pillar 3/annual report disclosures (not tabulated) but find no significant change in
liquidity following Pillar 3.
Finally, in model (6), we address the concern that the results for Pillar 3 are affected by the
implementation of Pillars 1 and 2 of the Basel II Accord or by concurrent changes in the local
economy. We reestimate equation (2) for the 67 benchmark banks with liquidity data available
and replace Pillar 3 with a Pseudo Pillar 3 indicator. This variable marks the period after a bank
domiciled in a Basel II country but exempt from Pillar 3 reporting releases its first annual report
under the Pillar 3 regime (28 banks). Similar to the disclosure analyses (see Table 4, column (6)),
the coefficient on Pseudo Pillar 3 is insignificant. This result suggests that the adoption of Pillars
1 and 2 or other local factors do not contribute to the significant liquidity benefits we show for
the treatment banks following the implementation of Pillar 3.
Event study of market reactions around initial release of Pillar 3 disclosures
In our final set of tests, we conduct a short-window event study to examine the immediate market
reaction to the release of banks’ initial Pillar 3 disclosures. We consider three direction-neutral
proxies for information content (see, e.g., DeFond et al. 2007; Landsman et al. 2012; Flannery
et al. 2017): the absolute value of cumulative abnormal stock returns, abnormal return volatility,
and trading volume.
We compute these measures for a three-day event window centered on the day of the release
of the first Pillar 3 report or, when integrated, the release of the first annual report containing the
Pillar 3 disclosures. We derive daily Abnormal Stock Returns from a simple market model with a
local market index and a 120-day estimation period.23 We then sum the daily abnormal returns
over the event window and compute absolute values. Abnormal Return Volatility is the mean of
squared daily abnormal returns over the three event days. Trading Volume is the daily number
of shares traded as a proportion of shares outstanding and averaged over the three event days. To
evaluate the market reaction during the event window, we compare the three variables to their
own values computed over 120-day benchmark windows using parametric and nonparametric
tests.24 We form three different benchmark windows, one centered around the release of the Pillar
3 disclosures, one ending six months earlier, and one ending a year before the event. This struc-
ture should help us to account for the potentially confounding effects of the financial crisis, which
overlaps substantially with the months surrounding the release of the initial Pillar 3 disclosures.
22. Of the 101 banks included in this analysis, 16 release the Pillar 3 report ahead of the annual report, and 37 release
it later than the annual report.
23. Specifically, for the event window, the estimation period starts on calendar day  10 around the release of the Pillar
3 information and extends over 60 trading days in each direction; otherwise, the estimation period covers the same
120 trading days as the benchmark windows.
24. For Abnormal Stock Returns, we take the mean of three-day cumulative abnormal returns computed for each of the
120 trading days of the benchmark window. For Abnormal Return Volatility, we compute the variance of daily
abnormal returns over the benchmark window.
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Table 7, panel A, reports the results of this univariate comparison. The average absolute
cumulative abnormal return in the three days around the release of Pillar 3 information is
3.6%. This value is higher than in any of the three benchmark windows but only significant
TABLE 7
Short-term market reactions to release of initial Pillar 3 reports
Panel A: Univariate analysis
Event window
(EW): 3 trading days
Benchmark window













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abs(Abnormal Stock Return) (N = 101) 0.036 0.034 0.030 0.021
t-stat [EW] = [BW] (0.53) (1.51) (3.79)***
p-value (nonparametric) (0.489) (0.491) (0.002)***
Abnormal Return Volatility (N = 101) 0.085 0.102 0.095 0.031
t-stat [EW] = [BW] (1.23) (0.45) (3.49)***
p-value (nonparametric) (0.001)*** (0.146) (0.002)***
Trading Volume (N = 94) 3.511 2.932 3.539 3.424
t-stat [EW] = [BW] (2.68)*** (0.10) (0.29)
p-value (nonparametric) (0.104) (0.739) (0.548)
Panel B: Regression analysis








Δ Risk Disclosures 0.024** 0.026** 0.004
(2.26) (2.25) (0.50)
Fixed effects Y Y Y
R2 0.052 0.051 0.062
# firms 101 101 94
Notes: The sample comprises up to 101 banks falling under the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements with data available.
We use the following market reactions for the analysis: (1) Abs(Abnormal Stock Return) is the absolute value of
three-day cumulative abnormal daily stock returns computed from a 120-trading day market model with local mar-
ket index returns (equal to the mean when reported over a 120-day window); (2) Abnormal Return Volatility is the
mean of squared (variance of) daily abnormal stock returns when reported over a three-day (120-day) window; and
(3) Trading Volume is the mean of the daily number of shares traded scaled by the number of shares outstanding.
For expositional purposes, we multiply Abnormal Return Volatility (Trading Volume) by 100 (1,000) in the univari-
ate analysis. In panel A, we report variable values for the three-trading day event window (EW) surrounding the
release of a bank’s initial Pillar 3 report as well as for three different 120-trading day benchmark windows (BW).
The BWs extend over the time periods indicated in the headings (and start on calendar day c). We also report
t-statistics from paired t-tests (p-values from Wilcoxon rank sum tests) comparing the variable values across the
EW and BW. In panel B, we scale the market reaction variables by their corresponding variable values over the
“pre/post” BW and use the log transformations of the resulting ratios as dependent variables. We regress them on
the continuous yearly change (Δ) in the Risk Disclosures score in the year leading up to the implementation of Pil-
lar 3 plus year (Y) fixed effects. The panel reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based
on robust standard errors. ** and *** represent significance levels of 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
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when compared to benchmark returns one year before. Similarly, stock returns are more
volatile—indicative of more new information getting into the market—compared to last
year’s abnormal return volatility but not relative to the other benchmark windows. Trading
volume during the event period is significantly higher than in the 120 trading days
surrounding it.
In Table 7, panel B, we examine whether the market reaction during the event window varies
with the extent of new risk information. To do so, we regress the three market outcome variables
on the continuous yearly change in the Risk Disclosures score in the year leading up to the imple-
mentation of Pillar 3 plus year fixed effects.25 The idea is that a greater increase in risk disclo-
sures conveys more new information to the markets. As the table shows, we find a positive
association between the magnitude of the disclosure change and abnormal returns or return vola-
tility but not for trading volume. In sum, we only find evidence of modest market reactions in the
three days around the initial release of the Pillar 3 disclosures, but we find that the results vary
with the amount of new information. This evidence suggests that markets likely needed some
time to fully interpret the enhanced risk disclosures.
6. Conclusion
In this study, we exploit the introduction of IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 of the Basel II Accord to draw
inferences on how banks respond to an equivalent set of disclosure rules implemented and
enforced by two different regulatory agencies. Employing a generalized DiD design together with
the staggered adoption of the two regulations, we find that compliance with risk disclosure rules
increases by up to 13 percentage points for all firms following IFRS 7 but that it increases by
another 14 percentage points for regulated banks after Pillar 3. The heterogeneity in compliance
is smaller when the two supervisory agencies are independent entities and stronger when there is
a larger imbalance of power between them. Yet we continue to observe that firm-level incentives
also play a role for banks’ compliance with the new rules. Our market-based tests show that the
enhanced risk disclosures go along with a reduction in bid-ask spreads on the order of 12 to 17
percentage points following Pillar 3 but not around IFRS 7.
Our results point to heterogeneity in how firms respond to the same set of rules implemented and
enforced by multiple regulatory agencies. The evidence is consistent with the idea of a regulator’s
“will” (i.e., its institutional design, resources, and incentives) being crucial for the outcome of the reg-
ulatory process (Agarwal et al. 2014). In particular, we show that when it comes to overseeing com-
plex risk disclosure requirements for banks, the specialized banking regulator plays a dominant role,
while the general securities market regulator seemingly underinvests in monitoring banks. In addition,
the evidence shows that investors do not necessarily update their priors about the risks of firms’ future
cash flows based on formal compliance but rather do so only when the disclosure changes are argu-
ably material because they are forced out by stricter enforcement through the banking regulator.
Our findings are subject to several caveats. First, our results might be affected by the contem-
poraneous introduction of Pillars 1 and 2 of the Basel II Accord—for instance, through a general
overhaul of banks’ risk management practices. We try to address this concern by running placebo
tests for the subset of benchmark banks that are subject to the first two Pillars but not Pillar 3 and
find no evidence of disclosure or liquidity effects. However, there remains a possibility that such
indirect effects amplify our results. Second, the findings could be driven by the mere presence of
an additional regulator and, thus, the duplication of existing enforcement efforts rather than the
differential effectiveness of enforcement by a specialized banking regulator. Given that we only
observe the implementation of IFRS 7 followed by Pillar 3, we cannot completely rule out such a
duplication effect. Yet we do not argue that specialized industry regulators per se are more effi-
cient enforcement agencies. Our cross-sectional results combined with the anecdotal evidence
25. Following Landsman et al. (2012), we scale the dependent variables by the corresponding variable values measured
over the pre/post benchmark window and log transform the resulting ratio for use in the regression analyses.
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from our case studies (see supporting information in section 2 of the online Appendix) emphasize
the importance of individual institutional attributes in shaping the interaction between multiple
regulators and, ultimately, regulatory outcomes. Finally, we note that our results do not speak to
the issue of whether the observed regulatory outcome for risk disclosures in the banking system
is socially optimal, or how they generalize to the broader population of listed firms and to differ-
ent time periods. The banking system was hit hard by the global financial crisis during 2007 and
2008. Sensitivity analyses that control for time trends and concurrent economic shocks suggest
that the crisis alone is not sufficient to explain our findings. However, the new disclosure regula-
tion might have fallen on fruitful grounds, as many banks were struggling to stay afloat, which
could partly amplify our results. We leave questions like these to future research.












Australian Securities and Investments
Commission
Yes No
Bahrain Central Bank of Bahrain Central Bank of Bahrain No Yes
Belgium Banking, Finance, and
Insurance
Commission
Banking, Finance and Insurance
Commissiona
No No





Danish Financial Supervisory Authority




Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority No No
France Banking Commission of
the Banque de
Francec
Financial Markets Authority Yes Yes




Greece Bank of Greece Hellenic Capital Market Commission Yes Yes
Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary
Authority
Securities and Futures Commission/
Financial Reporting Council
Yes Yes
Ireland Irish Financial Services
Regulatory Authorityd
Irish Auditing and Accounting
Supervisory Authority (delegated)
Yes Yes
Italy Bank of Italy Commissione Nazionale per le Società
e la Borsa
Yes Yes










Malta Financial Services Authority No No
Mauritius Bank of Mauritius Financial Services Commission Yes Yes





Financial Supervisory Authority of
Norway
No No
(The table is continued on the next page.)
A Tale of Two Supervisors 35











Oman Central Bank of Oman Capital Market Authority/Ministry of
Commerce
Yes Yes
Poland Central Bank Poland
(from 2008: Polish
FSA)
Polish Securities and Exchange
Commission (from 2006: Polish
FSA)
Yes Yes
Portugal Bank of Portugal Portuguese Securities Market
Commission
Yes Yes
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabian Monetary
Agency
Capital Market Authority/Ministry of
Commerce
Yes Yes
Singapore Monetary Authority of
Singapore
Accounting and Corporate Regulatory
Authority (delegated)
Yes Yes
















SIX Swiss Exchange (delegated) Yes No
United Arab
Emirates
Central Bank of the
United Arab Emirates
Securities and Commodities Authority/







Reporting Review Panel (delegated)
Yes No
Notes: The table lists the institutions responsible for the supervision of banks and security markets for the
Basel II countries. We use the annual reports of the local supervisory entities, the country reports from the
IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program, and the ESMA Activity Reports on IFRS Enforcement as data
sources for the classification. When the enforcement of financial accounting standards is fully delegated
(e.g., to a stock exchange), we indicate this separate authority (e.g., Switzerland). When the securities market
supervisor retains relevant competences for accounting enforcement together with a designated accounting
enforcement institution, we indicate both institutions (e.g., Kuwait). The table serves as basis for the coding
of the country-level partitioning variables Separate Regulators and Bank Supervision by Central Bank in
Table 5. aThe Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission as a unified regulator was dissolved in 2011. Its
responsibilities were transferred to the National Bank of Belgium (prudential oversight) and the Financial
Services and Markets Authority (securities markets, etc.). bThe Danish Securities Council as formal securi-
ties market regulator has delegated its accounting enforcement activities to the Danish Financial Supervisory
Authority (FSA) and the Danish Business Authority (DBA). Of these two, only the FSA is concerned with
accounting by financial institutions, while the DBA is responsible for all nonlisted and nonfinancial firms.
The role of the Danish Central Bank (Danmarks Nationalbank) is limited to the oversight of payment pro-
cesses. cIn 2010, the Commission Bancaire (CB) was merged with other financial regulators to form the
Autorité de contrôle prudentiel (ACP), which in 2013 became the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de reso-
lution (ACPR). Like the CB, the ACP/ACPR is an independent subcommittee of the Banque de France,
which controls its resources and whose governor chairs its board. dThe Irish Financial Services Regulatory
Authority was a constituent of the Central Bank. It was dissolved, and its supervisory activities were fully
integrated into the Central Bank’s regular operations in October 2010. eThe GAAP Monitoring Panel was a
joint venture of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants
(SAICA). In 2010, the GAAP Monitoring Panel received additional resources and enforcement powers and
was renamed the Financial Reporting Investigation Panel. fIn 2012, the Financial Services Authority was dis-
solved, and its responsibilities were transferred to two new authorities, the Prudential Regulation Authority
and the Financial Conduct Authority.
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